Community support

By Vic M. Taylor
Mindanews

Eighth part of a series

SO far in this series, we have looked at factors which this writer believes should be considered in addressing the situation of violence brought about by the Abu Sayyaf, in particular, and by extension, other militant groups.  The last three articles in this series will discuss certain approaches which this writer believes would be helpful to adopt in whatever interventions are planned to be undertaken to address this situation.

Any intervention in society which aims to succeed over the long term must have the support of the community or its targeted beneficiaries.  Of course there are programs whose sponsors are interested only in short-term outcomes, such as projects sponsored by politicians shortly before a political contest or election is to take place.  In such a case, the sponsors are really not interested what happens to the projects after they have achieved their own objectives, e.g., winning an electoral contest and capturing a political position with all the financial benefits and power that come along with it.  But if one is aiming to bring about radical change in society – the kind of change required for an end to violence and the institution of a condition of long-term peace – the support of the members of that society, the acceptance of the goals and the means by which to achieve them, is essential.

This is a principle accepted even by militants.  Jason Burke, a British journalist who has written extensively on Islamic extremism, for example, cites the concern expressed in 2005 by the senior leadership of Al Qaeda regarding the brutal methods employed by the “Emir of Al Qaeda for Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers” (or Al Queda in Iraq), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Burke recounts how “Bin Laden’s deputy, al-Zawahiri, and others within the organization repeatedly wrote to the leader of their Iraqi affiliate to remind him of the importance of maintaining good relations with local communities and encourage him, for the moment at least, to put any battle with the Shia on hold.  Al-Zawahiri invoked his own experience in Egypt and spoke of how ‘popular support is a decisive factor between victory and defeat [for] in [its] absence, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful… Others reminded the Jordanian of what happened in the early 1990s in Algeria, where the militant campaign to create an Islamic state had imploded in a welter of indiscriminate violence directed largely at civilians.  ‘Their enemy did not defeat them… They destroyed themselves with their own hands by their alienation of the population with their lack of reason… oppression, deviance and ruthlessness,’ wrote Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a senior Libyan extremist based in Pakistan who had spent time in Algeria.”

It is believed that the Philippine Government accepts this principle as well.  However, the way it is implemented by government agencies, in the author’s view, should be carefully considered.  To begin with, it is inevitable that government authorities are to a large extent constrained to working through the government bureaucracy and channels, and therefore any “community consultations” or interactions are, more often than not, consultations with local government officials (Governors, Mayors, Barangay Chairmen) or done through them.  Unfortunately, there often is the tendency for these elected officials to reflect not necessarily the views of the masses of their constituents but rather – if one has to be brutally frank – views that promote their own political ends and favor their political supporters.

Moreover, there sometimes is the tendency on the part of governmental and political authorities to try and manage the outcomes of any “consultations” undertaken. One often goes into these discussions with preconceived notions of what the situation is and what the outputs should be at the end. There should be a deliberate effort on the part of government functionaries who are tasked to interact with communities to truly listen to what other people have to say and try and see things from the perspective of their constituents.

Furthermore, there also often is the tendency on the part of people in authority to assume that they know what people need and what the solutions are to the problems of society.  And because they are in authority and have access to resources, more often than not it is their pre-identified policies, programs and projects which materialize, irrespective of whether they actually address the real needs or  not.

What is more – and this applies not just to Philippine governmental authorities but even to donor institutions, whether local or foreign – because of the pressure to show results, to account for funds allocated and to justify requests for new budgetary allocations (often increased from previous years), there is the tendency to “fast-track” project implementation, to show concrete results as quickly as possible, leaving beneficiary communities effectively as passive bystanders and recipients of the largesse of the project sponsors.

The author recalls a project showcased by a Philippine Marines battalion in the municipality of Patikul, one of the main areas of operation of the ASG in Sulu, in 2006.  This was a water supply project built by the soldiers for the community, consisting of water tanks and a three-kilometer long pipeline, bringing the water down from the source to service households along the route.  It was an impressive project, clearly well-intentioned, well built, clean, technically well planned, but within a year the Marines sounded out an NGO to help them get the community to take care of the project.  It had been built for the community, not with the community, and it suffered from neglect by the community and even deliberate efforts to sabotage it.

As recounted in an earlier article in this series, the same thing was experienced by the US Special Operations Forces that were working in Sulu in 2009.  We earlier described the lament of Sgt. Justin Richmond of the JSOTF-P regarding the death of two US soldiers, killed as a result of a roadside IED explosion, and why, despite the thousands of dollars poured into projects for the people in the area, no one had bothered to warn them of the impending disaster.

For several years between 2006 and 2010, this writer lived with a family in kilometer 4, Indanan municipality, whenever I visited Sulu.  Right beside the house was a USAID-funded deep well and water storage tank which, during the five-year period that I frequented Sulu, was not operational.  The community did not know why the system had not been activated but it is probable that that project had been listed as another “accomplishment” of the funding agency.

Every serious community development practitioner knows that a critical phase of any planned social intervention is the “social preparation” phase.  This is the initial phase of the intervention when the program facilitators work with the community to try and draw from them their perspectives on their situation and what they believe are the specific interventions needed.  It is during this phase that the community, through open dialogue, begins to understand the broader context of their situation, the underlying causes and, if handled properly, begins to realize that much of the power to address their condition lies within their hands.  This can lead to very surprising results. (to be continued)