The shadow economy (3)

By VIC M. TAYLOR
Mindanews

IN 2006, a cable was supposed to have been issued by the U.S. Embassy in Manila to various departments of the U.S. government – Department of State, Department of Justice, CIA, FBI, National Security Council, U.S. Pacific Command and others – providing information on trade in illegal drugs and their impact on peace and development efforts in Muslim Mindanao. Among other things, the cable states “…nearly all of the mayors, including the Vice-Governor of Sulu Province, are suspected to be involved in the narcotics trade”.[16]

It is said that the Abu Sayyaf has either engaged in the trade in illegal drugs as a source of revenue for their activities or have provided protection for traders. It is also said that the ASG has used drugs to entice young men to join their ranks and that ASG fighters use drugs before battle to make themselves more fierce, but these are anecdotal and need to be validated.

Whether or not the ASG themselves engage in the drug trade or use drugs themselves, the insidious nature of the illegal drug trade undermines the fabric of governance and society and should be addressed in any effort to bring about sustainable peace in the Armm. As Cagoco-Guiam and Schoofs clearly summarized it,

“The combination of fragile state institutions, colluding public officials and protection rackets explains the legal vacuum and sense of impunity that sustain the drug economy in the Armm. Narco-politicians reinforce the vicious circle between state fragility and criminal agendas, to the point that it amounts to the ‘criminalization of the state’… The illicit drug market provides these politicians with the resources to usurp power. Once elected into public office, they have every incentive to ensure that the drug economy, which sustains their political aspirations, remains unchallenged by the state. Through the control they exert over local government, security forces, and their constituents, narco-politicians are able to subvert the rule of law in order to advance their political and economic interests.”

As with the illicit trade in guns and drugs, it is said that political warlords are also involved in KFR activities. In exchange for protection, the warlords receive a share in ransom payments and can also use the kidnap gangs as their “muscles” to intimidate/eliminate opponents and others who may cross their paths. Evidence of this is difficult to come by, though.

Since much has been written about KFR activities in the region, we will just make two comments.

First is the observation, made by former AFP Chief-of-Staff Ricardo Visaya, that in the past few years, KFR activities have centered around Sulu and particularly around the island of Jolo. The reasons for this are varied: the denser jungles and rougher terrain, the ability of the KFR bands to move along different routes from Patikul to Talipao to Indanan to Parang to Panamao to Kalinggalang Caluang to Luuk, perhaps more tightly knit clan ties, etc.

The writer has made his own tally of kidnapping incidents since 2011 to the present focused on Sulu, i.e., kidnappings undertaken in Sulu itself or, if elsewhere, where the victims were brought to Sulu (invariably Jolo island) from where negotiations were then undertaken. Just looking at the last three years – 2014 to 2016, there were a total of 49 kidnapping incidents involving 107 victims, half of whom (53) were non-Filipinos. Among the Filipino victims (54), roughly 40% (19) were in fact Sulu residents. Of the Filipino kidnap victims, a quarter or 13 were Muslims. Of the 49 kidnapping incidents, only a third (16) took place in Sulu. The greater majority – 33 incidents – took place outside Sulu, with 13 of these taking place outside the country, several being sailors abducted from their vessels while on the high seas between the Philippines and Malaysia.

It was during this three-year period that seven kidnap victims were beheaded by the ASG, one child was strangled and thrown to the sea while the abductors were escaping, one victim was killed in the course of an encounter between the kidnap band and the military while another victim was found dead, most likely from illness.

A second comment involves another way by which KFR has been utilized, which is to deliver a message, described by Eric Gutierrez in his narration of the late Ali Dimaporo’s reaction to his removal from power following the Edsa Revolution, the departure of President Marcos and the assumption to the presidency of Cory Aquino. In a section entitled “Political Warlords Invent a New Weapon”, Gutierrez describes the kidnapping of Fr. Michel de Gigord, Catholic chaplain at the Mindanao State University campus in Marawi City, as well as that of 10 Carmelite nuns staying in a convent overlooking Lake Lanao. Gutierrez analyzes the incidents as follows:

“The June-July kidnappings of 1986 stood out for its symbolic significance. It occurred simultaneously with the political standoff sparked by the Aquino government’s replacement of Marcos ally Mohammad Ali Dimaporo as governor of Lanao del Sur and president of the Mindanao State University (MSU)…

“The chaplain of the MSU was snatched at the height of the standoff… The kidnapping captured maximum publicity, and the timing, place, and choice of victim were calculated for maximum political effect. De Gigord was a vocal critic of Dimaporo and an advocate of reform in the university. He was also a citizen of France, among the first countries that recognized the Aquino government…Worse, De Gigord was kidnapped on the day President Aquino appointed Dimaporo’s replacement as president of the MSU…

“The kidnapping of the 10 nuns was even more symbolic. Corazon Aquino was deeply religious and widely known to be a Carmelite devotee… Those who kidnapped the nuns were not only after a financial ransom, but clearly aimed to settle a score by targeting Aquino’s most visible ally in Marawi City…

“The kidnapping incidents were clearly intended to embarrass the President… Kidnapping the symbols of the new regime was a way to strike back….Dimaporo denied any involvement in the kidnapping incidents. He even went out of his way to play a principal role in the negotiations that led to the release of the victims. Through his actions Dimaporo made it clear that his personal involvement was critical in guaranteeing the safety of the victims….The release of the victims were made in Dimaporo’s residence in Binidayan to deny his rivals Saidamen Pangarungan and Princess Tarhata Lucman any political mileage out of the crisis.”[19]

Kidnapping for ransom and the illicit trade in guns and drugs are three activities that are rampant in the southern Philippines. By its very nature, KFR easily catches the attention of the public primarily because of the violence involved in its perpetration and the subsequent efforts to secure the release of the victims, whether through negotiations or military/police operations.

The illicit trade in guns and drugs is undertaken much more surreptitiously and is more difficult to trace. The trade in guns can be seen in the proliferation of firearms in the region. One kidnap victim in Basilan that the writer spoke with talked of how her captors fired their guns with abandon and practically unceasingly for several hours during the celebration of the Eid ul-Fitr as if the availability of ammunition was not a problem.

The illicit trade in drugs is much more insidious because of the added dimension of efforts exerted by drug traffickers to capture agencies of the State, whether through elected executive positions, positions with security agencies mandated to put an end to the trade or even members of the judiciary.

The perpetrators of KFR are well known Those involved in gununning and drugs are not as well known and should be identified, along with protectors (if there in fact are any) as well as others complicit in the trades and should be pursued as relentlessly as the current operations against KFR bands being undertaken.