Patricio Diaz
GENERAL Sanros City--The short title of the agreement is “Peace Agreement”. The common and popularly used “1996 Final Peace Agreement” is derived from its introductory paragraph, “The final Paragraph 152, FPA is referred to as “the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement”.
The phrases “final agreement” and “full implementation” are the keys to “what the 1996 FPA is” in reference to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and how compatible FPA and the CAB are.
The 1976 Tripoli Agreement, an agreement in principles to be fully “discussed later” and fleshed out, was not immediately implementable. The full details of the seven substantive provisions, Paragraphs 4 to 10, had to be first agreed in subsequent negotiation before the Agreement could be implemented to establish the Muslim “Autonomy in the Southern Philippines” declared in the “First” Part.
Paragraph 11 called for a GRP-MNLF “mixed Committee” to meet in Tripoli, Libya, February 5 to March 3, 1977, to thresh out the full details.
Paragraph 13 called for a GRP-MNLF joint meeting in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the “first week” of March to initial the finalized Agreement. This “final Agreement” would be signed in Manila (Paragraph 14).
“Immediately after” the Manila signing, “a Provisional Government” appointed by the Philippine President “shall be established” to prepare “for the election of the Legislative Assembly” and to “administer the area of autonomy … until a Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly” (Paragraph 15).
But the mixed Committee failed to finalize the Agreement. The domino-effect: There was no final agreement to initial and sign; there was no Provisional Government established according to Paragraph 15.
Libya President Muammar Gadaffi (variation: Khadaffy) tried to conciliate – obviously with the consent of the OIC and MNLF Chair Misuari – by convincing President Marcos through “wire diplomacy”—a three-day (if we recall correctly) exchange of wires on how to implement the Tripoli Agreement. President Marcos agreed and established a twoegion “Regional Autonomous Government” according to his own interpretation of Paragraph 16 of the Tripoli Agreement.
Gaddafi protested. Misuari and the OIC rejected the Marcos option. All negotiations and peace talks after that until the Jakarta peace talk failed in the attempt to finalize the 1976 Tripoli Agreement by agreeing on the full details of its seven substantive provisions. Only in the 1996 FPA was this realized.
Ironically, however, the reference to the 1996 FPA as “the final agreement” and the “full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement” raises thorny questions. First: If the FPA was the last GRP-MNLF peace agreement, was it a satisfactory political settlement of the Moro Question? Second: Were the proposals agreed in principle in the seven substantive provisions more fully fleshed out than the same in the CAB? Third: Is the Bangsamoro autonomy envisioned in the FPA more meaningful and genuine than that in the CAB? (to be continued)
