Fulfillment or denial anew? (2)

Patricio Diaz

AS already stated, the BTC will draft a new Bangsamoro enabling law to replace Draft BBL out of the CAB and the 1996 FPA with pertinent provisions from RA 9054 and Ipra and to submit the proposed enabling law to the Congress six months after its constitution. Dureza (MN, 7/19/16) said the new BTC “will also be mandated to propose amendments to the Philippine Constitution that are pertinent to the Bangsamoro as inputs towards eventual federalism in the land.”

In BPDR, the “New BTC will call for an inclusive ALL-Moro Assembly to approve the new draft” before submitting it to the Congress “by July 2017”. It is also mandated to “[s]pearhead the dialogue and conversation of people in Mindanao on the Bangsmoro peace process”. These are the ultimate quests for inclusivity.

Dureza said that the government will also implement “massive development on the ground” while the passage of a Bangsamoro enabling law and the shift to federalism are being done simultaneously (MN, 7/19/16). This development refers to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao that will become the Bangsamoro.

Other than in general statements, Dureza has not mentioned specific details and timeline about the economic component of the peace process in the Duterte peace roadmap. None appeared in the apparent briefing guide that has been anonymously sent to us. But this is not a new element in the Mindanao peace process.

This is Paragraph 6, Third Part, of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement: “The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have their own economic and financial system. The relationship between this system and the economic and financial system of the State shall be discussed later.”

The above provision of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement was fleshed out in Part “III.D” of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, Paragraphs 126 to 151, with the sub-title “The Economic and Financial System, Mines and Minerals”. The FPA, as stated in its Paragraph 153, “is the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement”.

For the interim, from a month after the signing of the FPA in 1996 until the ratification of R.A. No. 9054 in 2001, President Fidel V. Ramos created by Executive Order No. 371 Szopad (Special Zone of Peace and Development), the transition mechanism – instead of Provisional Government — of the autonomy under the FPA. The National Economic and Development Authority formulated the “Integrated Development Framework and Investment Program 1997-1999” for Szopad.

One of the three aspects of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace is “Rehabilitation”. It was fleshed out in an agreement   signed on May 7, 2002 the Article V of which provides how rehabilitation and development projects are to be implemented through “a project implementation body”. This body was later created as BDA (Bangsamoro Development Authority) that according to MILF’s Luwaran reports has performed well its task within the means available from the government, foreign countries and international agencies.

The negotiations between government and MILF under the Arroyo and Aquino III administrations were repeatedly stalled by contentious issues – not only political but also economic. The failure of Draft BBL to pass the 16th Congress was a denial of meaningful economic concessions granted to the Moros, as much as a rejection of political provisions perceived as unconstitutional.

The Peace Commission of President Corazon C. Aquino, tasked to tackle peace problems in the country, deemed “economic development” as one of the foundations of “full and lasting peace” together with “social justice” and “political stability”. To acknowledge, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, it explained, the 1987 Constitution mandated the creation of autonomous regions (Article X, Sections 1, 15 to 21). Section 20 provides that the autonomous regions must have legislative powers over the “Creation of sources of revenues (2)” and “Ancestral domain resources (3)”.

In the Six Paths of Peace, the peacemaking guide under President Ramos, the economy was one of the three concerns in the first path: “a. Pursuit of Social, Economic and Political Reforms: This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.”

In all administrations from 1976 to the half of 2016, economic development had been a key component of the peace process – clearly formulated, signed and promulgated. But this was half-heartedly implemented or not at all.  Will fulfillment come under Duterte?  As stated to the media, it is a major part of the Duterte peace roadmap. However, there is no way to know the details and timeline of this economic development initiative since no official copy of the roadmap has been released to media or made accessible on-line.

However, here’s a report from government news sources in relation to Dureza’s espousal of “massive economic development”: “President Duterte forthwith directed that the executive order of the peace office be amended to enable it to oversee all development projects and at the same time empower it to implement projects that are related to peace. (Opapp website, PIA: 7/19/16)”