Are negotiations possible?

By VIC M. TAYLOR
Mindanews

IN a speech given in a military camp recently, President Duterte ordered the troops to “crush” the insurgents in Marawi, adding “when I say crush them, you have to destroy everything”.  This was with regard to the current problem in Marawi.  But what about the longer-term issue of addressing the Islamic State-affiliated forces in the country?  Is this a situation that is amenable to negotiations, in the same manner that the MNLF and the MILF uprisings were approached?

In one of his khutbas,  “Mu’ahada, Muhadana atawa Mufada:  Pagsulut ha antara sin Mujahideen iban Satru” (Peace between the Mujahideen and the Enemy), Abdurajak Janjalani spoke about the negotiations that had been entered into between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government at that time (early to mid-1990s).  Janjalani pointed out that those negotiations were leading to confusion as to what the real objective of the MNLF was: whether independence or autonomy; whether an Islamic system of governance would be set up or not.

Drawing from Abdullah Azzam (“Conditions for Making Peace Treaties with Kuffar” in his fatwa “In Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman”),  Janjalani pointed out a number of conditions that must be met before any negotiations were to be undertaken or any agreements were to be reached. These conditions were:

1. If the state of Jihad which has been declared is Fard Ayn – meaning that it is a personal obligation that falls on all Muslims (as distinguished from Fard Kifaya, which is an obligation that falls on the community of Muslims and can be fulfilled by some members of the community, relieving the rest of the obligation) – then any peace agreement entered into is from the outset null and void;
2. Any agreement entered into cannot allow the enemy or the unbelievers to remain on any part of the Muslim territory;
3. To be valid, any agreement must give total control over the territory to Muslims, and the system of governance must be Islamic;
4. The agreement must not provide a timetable or a gradual turnover of governance to Muslims. An Islamic system of governance must be implemented immediately;
5. Any agreement entered into must not contain provisions that are contrary to Sharia law. For example, nothing in the agreement must allow practices such as the selling of liquor within the Muslim territory, or allowing women to wear clothes contrary to Islamic culture;
6. The agreement must not allow the unbelievers to exercise their religious practices in Muslim territory.

Janjalani pointed out that in the discussions between the MNLF and the Philippine government, and in the agreements signed, none of these conditions were mentioned or even referred to. He pointed to Afghanistan as the model to be followed.  In that case, the Soviets withdrew completely, not leaving a single soldier or civilian behind.  An Islamic system of government was established without any participation whatsoever on the part of the Soviets.  The Soviets did not dictate or have any say in the process by which the new system of government was established.  The Soviets recognized the new government and Afghanistan as an independent state, and made clear their intent to achieve peace with the Afghans.  Moreover, the Afghan Mujahideen ensured that the Russians were sincere and fulfilled their commitments.

Thus, in the case of the Philippines, Janjalani pointed out that any negotiations with the Philippine government must ensure the following:

1. The Philippine military must withdraw completely from Mindanao, to include all those who may have sided or co-operated with them, unless they agree to follow the Islamic system of government that would be set up;
2. The withdrawal must be unconditional;
3. An Islamic system of government must be set up without any input from the Philippine government;
4. The Philippine government must recognize the new government to be set up by the Mujahideen and must express its desire to make peace with this state;
5. The Mujahideen must ensure that the Philippine government is sincere, that it truly wants to make peace, and does not have an intention to subsequently betray or violate the agreement entered into.

Only under such conditions should any discussions be entered into with the Philippine government.  It is for the reasons presented above that Janjalani rejected the discussions undertaken and the agreements entered into by the MNLF with the government, and stated that the objective must always be to set up an Islamic system of government in Mindanao.  (From Jihad Fiy Sabilillah, a compilation of khutbas of Ustadz Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani put together by his students/followers.)

If the present crop of militants in Mindanao – the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (Biff), the AKP and others – adopt this perspective of Abdullah Azzam and Abdurajak Janjalani, then it would  not only be the Philippine Government who would not be amenable to negotiations but even the militants themselves unless these very strict and seemingly unacceptable conditions are met. (to be continued)