Rush to seal deals locked in delay, confusion, funds lack (1)

By Malou Mangahas
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism .

SINCE May, the task force leading the government’s efforts to rebuild the Islamic City of Marawi in Lanao del Sur has been setting and resetting groundbreaking rites for a multibillion-peso, 22-component project under its “minimum scope of work” in the 250-hectare “conflict zone” or the city’s “most affected area” (MAA).

Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) has rescheduled the groundbreaking rites for seven times now. The latest target date for the event is this Sept. 19. By the Task Force’s record of extended negotiations in the last 10 months, however, the chances of that pushing through are slim. Unfortunately, that would mean that the 350,000 residents displaced and dispossessed by a war not of their own choice or liking may have to wait some more before their city is able to rise again and their lives can return to normal.

Amid the impatience and disgust of the displaced Meranaw, the Task Force is reportedly poised to announce shortly a strategic shift in its procurement mode to fast-track projects for Marawi’s MAA.

Instead of submitting all 22 components of the “minimum scope of work” for Marawi’s ground zero to a joint-venture agreement (JVA) with a private consortium, the Task Force may soon conduct a negotiated procurement for two urgent components: debris management and road infrastructure.

In a series, 12 other components deemed to be “non-income generating” will be bidded out, also via negotiated procurement. That would mean leaving only eight components deemed to be “profitable” or with some promise of income, to be covered by the JVA with the private consortium.

But money, billions of it, which government must guarantee would be available and be covered with budget authority, is the first requirement of the shift to negotiated procurement. Marawi’s MAA projects have no allocations as yet in either the current 2018, or in the proposed 2019, national budgets.

The options are few: public funds will have to be re-aligned for Marawi’s MAA projects from elsewhere, or a supplemental budget might have to be submitted and passed by Congress. Either way,  Marawi’s displaced and dispossessed might have to brace for further delays.

“This is not delay, we are just updating indicative, tentative timelines,” TFBM chairman Eduardo del Rosario insisted in an interview. “We are doing everything possible.”

“We will still meet the deadline for the projects to be completed until last quarter of 2021,” he also said.

Fifteen months ago, on May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo R. Duterte had launched massive military operations against Islamist militants in Marawi. By “liberation day” six months later, the 8,407-hectare home of the Meranaw had been carpet-bombed, reduced to a hamlet of about 10 to 15 million tons of debris, a wasteland. More than 1,000 lives were lost, including those of at least 47 civilians.

The government pledged to do its best to rebuild the Islamic city and help it recover in the quickest time possible. It even convened an inter-agency task force for that purpose in June last year while the fighting was still going on, before replacing it with the TFBM four months later.

But nearly a year after the conflict ended, Marawi remains in ruins. In the meantime, the selection committee tasked to choose the entity to undertake the project is mired in major issues that divide or confound its seven members – among whom is the TFBM head — its consultants from the Public-Private Partnership Center (PPP), and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).

‘Quick but Legal’

The seven-person Bangon Marawi Selection Committee (BMSC) also serves as the bids and awards committee of TFBM. It is authorized to conduct negotiations and select private partners for the joint venture envisioned in the Marawi rehabilitation project.

“Quick but legal” – that is the goal, BMSC head Falconi V. Millar had told PCIJ.

The committee’s speed in accomplishing its work, however, has been hindered by one worry after another, topmost of which is whether or not to revise the procurement guidelines and scope of work it had prescribed and set out to enforce.

Option 1 is to include all 22 components of its original “minimum scope of work” in a joint-venture agreement (JVA) with a private consortium as its guidelines so state. Option 2 is to go not only for a combined JVA with a private consortium for the eight “profitable” components, but also a negotiated procurement for 14 other components with little or no promise of future income. That change in scope of work, though, would certainly require funding by government for the 14 “non-profitable” components if these would be submitted to negotiated procurement. (to be continued)